

*China
Relations*

Bates

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CHINA

CONSULTATION

1962

Synthesis of Presentations, Comments,
and Discussions

(compiled and edited by M. Searle
Bates for the China Committee)



FAR EASTERN OFFICE
DIVISION OF FOREIGN MISSIONS

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INTRODUCTORY STATEMENT - CHINA CONSULTATION - 1962

The third China Consultation sponsored by the China Committee of the Division of Foreign Missions, National Council of Churches, was held September 11-12 at Seabury House, Greenwich, Conn. As in the previous meetings in 1958 and 1960, the purpose of the Consultation was to bring together executives of our member boards and agencies with China concerns and responsibilities and other denominational representatives to look as objectively as possible at the current situation in China and some of the key issues related to developments in that country. It is not intended that such conferences result in any consensus of opinion or statement of policy, but only that presentations and discussions help in clearer understanding of what has been happening in China and especially to the Christian churches of that country.

We were again fortunate in the high quality of the presentations made by a number of competent and well prepared leaders, in the helpful commentaries at each session and in the general discussion that followed in each case. Following the pattern of the 1960 report, we have attempted to give the essential information brought out by the presentations, comments and discussion without attribution to any of those who participated. Dr. M. Searle Bates, Professor of Missions at Union Theological Seminary New York, most generously offered to edit all of this material. Aided by papers prepared in advance or notes taken at the time, as well as by the careful summaries made by recorders from the group with responsibility in each session, he has given hard and devoted labor to this task. To Dr. Bates and all those who contributed to the success of the Consultation the China Committee expresses its sincere appreciation.

Those of us who were present were again impressed with the divergence of opinion that exists concerning China issues and the tremendous importance of China and what happens there for all the world. What follows is a summary of the great mass of material presented at the Consultation. It does not represent policy positions of the China Committee or the National Council of Churches of Christ. It should be understood as a report of conditions and concerns which we feel should be known to our member boards and others.

Wallace C. Merwin, Secretary,
China Committee

FOREWORD

On the basis of favorable response to the China Consultations of September 1958 and 1960, the Far Eastern Office and the China Committee of the Division of Foreign Missions of the National Council of Churches planned and conducted a further China Consultation on September 11 and 12, 1962. Participants numbered 41, representing 31 agencies or organizations concerned for the life and work of the churches in China and for the responsibilities of citizens in several countries variously related to China; or invited to make particular contributions of information and understanding.

In accord with the effort and experience of 1960, it was determined in advance to publish a booklet which would summarize in a unified statement the major elements of the several presentations, prepared comments upon the texts of the presentations, and consequent extemporaneous discussion. Topics and contributors were chosen with the intent to seek varied experience and thought, rather than to plot a line toward agreed positions or recommendations. Where they needed or desired it, participants were put at ease for frank expression of their minds by assurance of freedom from attribution or retribution.

Such procedure and the spirit of the gathering resulted in entire liberty of statement, even upon sensitive issues or situations requiring responsible confidence on behalf of persons living and working under difficult governments. Readers of this report are invited to enter into the same spirit of free inquiry and responsible use of its benefits. The limitations of this method should be clearly recognized. The several persons who have actively participated in some stage of the reporting process do not know how many persons corroborated, opposed, approved, disapproved, simply accepted, or merely heard, any particular statement. No test of opinion was made at any time.

We have here, therefore, an indirect and composite report, attempting to represent fairly the information or interpretation or position set forth by one or by several qualified persons. Its value depends largely upon intelligent and sympathetic use by Christians concerned with the topics touched upon. Obviously, no statement or view here expressed has been endorsed by or even presented to, any unit of the National Council of Churches or unit of a member church. The sponsors of the Consultation present the report as one among many actual and possible contributions to study and understanding of important problems.

The compiler has had before him texts or notes of six presentations, plus the summary reports of five sessions including their respective elements of comment and discussion — each of these reports done by a recorder assigned to that task. For selection, arrangement, and wording, however, he is responsible.

THE CURRENT SITUATION IN MAINLAND CHINA

A compound of significant reports from manifold sources was given remarkable vitality by the full and balanced witness of an excellently qualified visitor to China in 1958, under conditions that permitted unusual freedom of movement and inquiry. The visitor has been able to check and to supplement his data of 1958 by consultation with a number of subsequent travellers and observers as well as the use of printed information coming through varied channels.

The total picture available shows a depressing uniformity of expression from circles as diverse as those of labor, the law, and the churches Catholic and Protestant. Patriotism and loyalty to the regime were apparently machine-made in phrasing, though strongly felt. Communists are the most completely irrational and fanatic, but many educators and others, including Christians, are almost equally convinced that at every step the regime is necessary and right. There is a puritanical pressure upon details of personal life, approaching exhibitionism. The Communist claim of absolute and exclusive truth, especially in social matters, is absurd; but it is regularly echoed by intellectuals.

On the other hand, improvement in the living conditions and the health of the masses, at least by comparison with an earlier generation, continues to be confirmed. The appearance and the behavior of the children win favorable comment. Public order is excellent, without visible threat of force. Gains in human well-being are undoubtedly related to vigorous efforts at industrialization and to reorganization of food supply. The human gains are more impressive to some visitors and to the Chinese whom they observed and talked with, than are the parades of official statistics on economic change. Truly an immense *social* revolution has transformed the lives of great numbers, though its totalitarian aspects are repulsive.

Despite acute problems in the Chinese economy, and serious difficulties in food supply 1959-1961, the preponderance of evidence and dependable opinion seems to be that the regime is in firm control and will so continue for the foreseeable future. Production and distribution of food have improved in 1961 and 1962 from the preceding low points.

RELATIONS OF THE UNITED STATES AND OTHER NATIONS WITH CHINA: PUBLIC ATTITUDES

1. United States Policy

Current thinking on United States relations with China was carefully presented by a person adequately in touch with official and near-official opinion in Washington, then followed by vigorous but constructive criticisms from Christian and international positions. The United States government, particularly its executive branch, believes that it is working to maintain the measure of peace that now exists, moderating the continuing difficulties and fresh ones as they arise; and, concurrently, is checking Communist expansion in East Asia. Less immediately in view and less clearly formulated is the long-term objective which ought to be more adequately developed: keeping the way open for, and fostering whenever possible, the transition of China to a free, stable nation, cooperating in international life.

Although caution is necessary in evaluating some of the slightly favorable tendencies of recent years, the change from the very bad situation of 1950 is encouraging. Great improvement in Japan and in Taiwan, some in Korea, the Philippines, and Burma, have supported a wholesome check to the risk of a Communist wave rushing over Eastern Asia. After a phase of rising Communist threat and influence, came an obvious waning — reassuring, so far as it goes, though one can have no confidence that decline will continue.

Contemporary problems are frankly discussed in circles concerned with policy. The preponderance of official opinion seems to be that United States recognition of the Peking regime and its admission to the United Nations are issues a little less heated than formerly. The prevailing attitude is negative, on the ground that disturbance of confidence within several neighbors of China, and enhancement of Chinese status and influence, would outweigh expected benefits. The "Two-China" position is unqualifiedly refused by Taipei as well as by Peking, and is probably not viable. Peking's attitude toward the United Nations, coupled with the demand for incorporation of Taiwan, points to plenty of trouble on the threshold of the international forum, and destructive tactics if admission should some time be achieved.

The American embargo on exports to the mainland and restraint of bank transactions are less important than during the Korean War, but should be retained until reciprocal bargaining is possible. The United States' position on food is not rigid, and can take account of circumstances. But it is unlikely that Peking would ask for or accept grain from us while any resource

remains in China, Australia, or Canada. Possibilities of travel in very closely restricted categories exist, but they are not likely to expand unless Peking admits the selected newsmen who have received passports valid for China.

The offshore islands involve risks to peace and to U.S. interests, since both Peking and Taipei desire to maintain military contact and the posture of war. American policy moderates Chiang's hopes and acts, but is not prepared to chance the results of insisting that he withdraw. A significant element of American official opinion holds that Taiwan has made important progress in the past ten years, from which all elements of the population benefit. The United States would not initiate, and does not intend to carry on, a major war to assist Chiang's desire to return to power on the mainland. There appears to be little active concern on the part of American officials for the political longings of the Taiwanese as over against the Chiang regime and its companions immigrant from the mainland.

Responsible circles in Washington are keenly interested in the Sino-Soviet disputes, but do not see them as necessarily favorable to peace and normalization of relationships in the Far East, or as inviting American efforts to intensify them and to extract advantage from them.

On broad lines, then, United States policy aims at the continuance of present barriers to Chinese advance, the avoidance of active hostilities, cooperation with friendly nations, improvement in small things as possible, and — for the long run — movement toward open societies in cooperative relationships. So much for more or less official views.

2. American and Other Opinions on United States Policy

Comments from varied angles were made in good spirit, often expressing dissatisfaction with the present trend of policy and attitudes, and advocating fresh consideration or specific revisions. Mere containment, often in prevailingly military terms, has proved risky and frustrating. Political and even Christian opinion have tended to be responses to situations now past. It is high time for realistic appraisal of the prospects of the Peking regime, and also of Chiang's dream of return to the mainland.

The degree of misunderstanding, even of enmity, in Sino-American relations is tragic. It calls for important and persistent efforts at remedy. The drift in and toward conflict is intolerable. More should be attempted through friendly states which are politically less distant from Peking, and through various agencies of the United Nations.

Several participants emphasized the different stance of other countries, at least in some aspects of relations with China and of public attitudes toward her. It was felt that the United States makes too much of South Korea, Taiwan, and the Philippines, in its ratings of Asian positions; and too little of Japan and other states. Important strands in Japanese opinion are the sense of guilt for the immense damage done to China before 1945, — China the historic tutor of Japanese culture; and the desire to restore the normal economic relations urgently needed by both countries, rather than to be the tool of American policy in boycotting and damaging China. There are conflicting views and anxieties in Japan. But Cabinets heavily bound to the United States have tended increasingly to insist upon a freer hand in improving relations with the impressive neighbors. All three major parties look, in differing ways, toward resumption of intercourse with China. A considerable stream of Japanese visitors has brought back predominantly favorable, though sometimes qualified, reports of Chinese progress as measured from pre-Communist times. Most of the young Japanese tend to think in socialist terms friendly to the Chinese system as they understand it. The issue of Communism, as Americans see it, is for many, many Japanese secondary to their concern for *Chinese* relationships.

British and Canadian opinions are by no means uniform, but they seem unmistakably to lean toward ordinary diplomatic relationships and admission to the United Nations. This is true despite the discouraging limitations of British representation in Peking. British publicists often stand for the "Two-China" perspective as sound despite all contrary declarations. Private visits, though falling off in the hard years since 1957, have been significant in maintaining some sense of human presence. One Canadian knows seventy-five of his countrymen who have visited Communist China, returning with diverse observations and interpretations which obviously give to Canada a better chance of understanding than would a situation of no personal contacts.

Regret for the rigidity of American policy in at least two settings was vigorously expressed. Partisan attack upon moderation or revision begets caution and inflexibility among those who are thereby thrown on the defensive. Also, prime emphasis upon military and related political considerations have tended to subordinate measures of economic betterment and reform in East Asian countries aided by the United States. A major instance of this difficulty is the reluctance to consider the plight and the appeals of the Taiwanese who constitute more than four-fifths the population of the island historically theirs and actually Chiang's. The Taiwanese want to direct their own life, and not to be dragged into the meaningless peril of

war with the mainland for interests not their own; furthermore, not to be subject to the risk of collapse or deals after President Chiang passes from the stage, which might result in turning them over to the mercies of Peking.

PHASES AND INTERPRETATIONS OF CHRISTIAN EXPERIENCE IN CHINA

In view of the informational contributions of *The China Bulletin*, annual reviews and occasional papers of the China Committee, plus the recent and comprehensive book by Francis P. Jones, *The Church in Communist China*,* it was thought best in the planning of the 1962 Consultation to turn aside from general treatment of Protestant churches and Christians on the mainland, in order to consider some phases of Christian experience relevant but not usually in the center of our attention. The following topics were formulated for prepared presentation and comments, followed by discussions not closely confined: theological thinking among Protestants, as evidence in the Three-Self Movement; some observations and opinions of the Protestant situation, derived from sources other than American; the experience of Roman Catholics; the situation and problems of Christians in Taiwan.

1. Theological Thinking among Chinese Protestants

Because a complete paper on recent Protestant thought will soon be available,** the subject is reported here in brief compass only. Against a background of relatively infrequent and inadequate theological effort before 1949, the practical and psychological restraints upon the expressing of bold and challenging thought concerning central issues for Christians in these days are largely effective. However, a number of answers to visitors' questions gave indications of serious thinking and rethinking induced by the experience of the new order.

Some of the leaders of the Three-Self Movement have been deeply concerned with and for the unity of Christians in circumstances that made sharp differences of mind and practice both painful and dangerous. Where this concern has been theologically rooted and formulated, its published forms would be commended among most Christians elsewhere. Other persistent topics, following terminology used within the Movement, include "The Christian and the World", repeatedly presenting a world-accepting and world-affirming view, as opposed to any past or contemporary expression either of other-worldliness or of sectarian withdrawal from mundane responsibility. In one prominent controversy a devotional book of missionary origin was rejected for its acceptance of suffering as the will and discipline of God.

*Friendship Press, 1962.

**See the considerable essay by Francis P. Jones, "The Theology of the Three-Self-Movement", to be published in 1963 by *Religion in Life*.

Important thinking on "Church and State" sets forth theological limits, biblically derived, for the allegiance required by the state, but contends that there is no present problem for the Chinese Christian, whose government is unmistakably joining in the creative work of God by raising the material and moral level of life. Under the rubric of "Belief and Unbelief" there is maintained implicitly and sometimes with stark frankness, that no conciliation is possible between atheism and Christian faith, although Christians do work and ought to work with Communists for the maintenance and betterment of human society. "Faith and Works" usually are considered in the language of the Epistle of James or that of ordinary humanism though Y. T. Wu, prominent leader of the Three-Self Movement, unifies them in a dialectic that parallels Marxian combining of theory and practice. Wu and others, however, have on occasion made stoutly Christian affirmations against the disappearance of faith in all-sufficiency of works.

Sin has largely removed itself to the persons of "imperialists" and to regrettable remainders of their works, but occasionally it is faced in the biblical language of universal truth. Love for enemies is often transformed into the will to "liberate" them from their resistance to the righteous necessity of Communist expansion; or, alternatively, into love for the victims and dupes of the enemy, which requires effective victory over the enemy.

2. Some Observations and Opinions Coming from Abroad

All in all, when the channels of expression are thoughtfully evaluated, the evidence of enduring faith is significant. We must recognize, however, that our material since 1958 is distressfully meager. Interesting and valuable as are the fragments of information and expression reaching us from China, often tardily and indirectly, it is plain that much is unknown and judgment must be suspended. Report and discussion of what little is learned in this or that quarter are often restrained by fear of consequences for individuals in China. We are reminded, by external as well as by American friends, that many local churches have been closed or are sparsely attended, with few additions likely; that reluctance to invite visitors may indicate awareness of weakness; and that the general trends since the forty-day blossoming of "A Hundred Flowers" in 1957 appear to make life difficult for Christians, particularly for pastors and others who take responsibility.

What is the real meaning of the fact that a fairly full Chinese article on New Delhi said nothing about the admission of the Russian Church to the World Council of Churches? That the Chinese member churches of the World

Council, and the National Christian Council of China, a member of the International Missionary Council, did not withdraw from these bodies which have been repeatedly and severely criticized by prominent Chinese Christians? That some slight connection with the East Asia Christian Council persists? At the same time we must remember that real communications with the world bodies ceased abruptly by the request of responsible Chinese.

Japanese Christian visitors, notably a National Christian Council delegation invited in 1959 by the Three-Self Movement, were impressed by the spirit in which Chinese Christians worked for public welfare. They issued a favorable report on their observations. In semi-private conversations, several of the Japanese disclosed their anxieties. In theological analysis of the situation, they asked what should or could be the prophetic note and the proclamation vis-a-vis the communistic regime; what can the *koinonia* mean when the Christian corporate life and worship are severely limited? The Japanese declared their Christian confidence in the presence of the enduring future of the Church in China.

3. Glimpses of the Roman Catholic Experience

The Roman Catholic experience in China is roughly equivalent to that of the Protestants, though it differs in specifics. Probably the expulsion of missionaries was greater privation for the Chinese Catholics than it was for the Protestants, since there were only some 2,700 Chinese priests to shepherd 3,250,000 Catholics widely dispersed over great rural regions. Repeated efforts to make a Three-Self movement prevail were fairly well resisted till 1955. Then came much sharper elimination of stalwart leaders; and in 1956-57 the creation of a "Patriotic Association" which took over organizational functions and isolated Chinese Catholics from Rome. Intense campaigns of "political education" worked through to the deposition of several stouthearted bishops, and in 1958 secured the consecration of a new bishop without papal permission, the pivot for reconstitution of the hierarchy. The consecration of such a candidate is religiously valid, but the administration initiated by it is schismatic and every person participating in the consecration is automatically excommunicated.

Enormous pressure was used to bring about this displacement of the duly constituted hierarchy by men desirable in the sight of the regime. More than forty of the irregularly chosen bishops are known to have been installed, and fewer than ten of the properly authorized bishops (130 in 1948) are able to remain in office. The hierarchy, so tremendously central to the Catholic Church, is in the hands of political appointees. There is confidential evidence of faithful persistence by many priests.

Some Catholic reports present the desperate picture of a few churches open for show of liberty, but shunned by devout Catholics; of priests at ordinary labor holding private masses only; no baptisms and no last rites. Some consolation is taken in the fact that, so far as is known, there has been no tampering with dogma or moral commandments. No information is at hand to indicate significant steps in fellowship or common action by Catholics with Protestants. Attention was called to an excellent historical survey of the Catholic experience 1949-59 in the final chapter of *The Communist Persuasion*, by Father Eleutherius Winance.*

If the Catholic, Protestant, Buddhist and Muslim stories are set in parallel columns, some common stages run across them all and some of the published statements of their leaders follow at certain crises a single pattern of language — no doubt dictated to them by organized requirement, or even by paradigm, unless some standard bits have been falsely attributed to them. Perhaps a general key is to be found in a recent editorial of a prominent paper, declaring policy to be for freedom of individual belief, but against organized religion.

This part of the discussion may well close in sympathetic pondering of the statement of Cardinal Agagianian, Prefect of the Congregation of the Propaganda: "We are certain that under the pressure of moral and physical compulsion some people have forgotten their duty. Yet I am confident that, once the reign of terror is over, many of them will return because they are loyal to the Church."

4. The Situation and Problems of Christians in Taiwan

Certain aspects of the general and the Christian situation in Taiwan have not received adequate consideration by our constituency. Before 1945 the mission relationships of that island were almost exclusive English and Canadian, rather than American; and within one denominational sphere, the Presbyterian. The Christians, naturally, were found within the main stock of the population: of Chinese origin, but under Japanese rule from the moment of modernization (1895), and therefore not participating in the experience of the Chinese *nation* but possessing their own experience in certain particular respects more beneficial than the disorderly and dubious freedom of the mainland 1911-1949. When the Japanese were displaced, the Taiwanese suddenly found themselves under the rule of Chinese who were strangers, albeit kindred two generations back; and the strangers dramatized and deepened the estrangement by the baneful massacre

*Kenedy, 1959.

of February 1947, which destroyed several thousand actual and potential leaders and built resentful distrust into practically all the significant families.

The regime has made real improvements, but it started so low that the improvements have not brought the needful minimum of opportunity and satisfaction for the Taiwanese who are at least five times the number of mainlanders arriving in or near 1949-50. Taiwanese share in the lower elements of army and government, but do not have access to significant positions. The abler Taiwanese must find their lives in family and business, apart from public affairs. Common life in the schools, and some intermarriage resulting therefrom, will be helpful if there is a long future for it. But lack of confidence in the regime prevails, sapping the needed efforts toward a sounder society. Taiwanese dislike the Government's direction of effort and resources toward the recovery of a "homeland" that is not home for Taiwanese. Indeed, this striving is for a goal other than the good of Taiwan, and therefore sets the Government basically at odds with deep interests of the people. Taiwanese distrust the ability of the Government to maintain itself against determined Communist attack or subversion, and hear with anxiety the rumors of factional disintegration and even of deals with Peking after President Chiang ceases to control. Moreover, the unreal position of the Government in maintaining its claims to be "China" when it does not truly have the hearts of the island population and is so greatly dependent on American power, fosters a fearsome sensitiveness to discussion — even to constructive discussion — of basic public issues.

In these conditions Christians must live their lives, churches and missions must do their work. The Presbyterian Church comprises a full 400 Taiwanese congregations and another 400 among the tribesmen of the mountains — the latter numbering fewer than 200,000 in total, two percent of the population, now emerging from isolation but playing no part in the wider life of the island. The Taiwanese Christians, aided by a modest number of missionaries, did significant pioneer and developmental work in education, health and other services. Now the Government, in policies determined and administered by mainlanders, has largely occupied these fields. The churches tend to concern themselves less with the whole community, and more closely with the personal lives of believers. Despite a good many efforts by Christian individuals to bridge the gulf between Taiwanese and mainlanders, including Christian Taiwanese and Christian mainlanders, even missionaries to Taiwanese and missionaries to mainlanders, there is all too little of helpful association. The linguistic division is both a cause of separation and a justification for its perpetuation, but the political and

psychological factors previously mentioned are also operative among most of the Christians.

The mainland Christians characteristically are refugees or alien official and middle-class people, who do not learn the Taiwanese speech and who delight in association with their own mandarin-speaking kind from "back home" — when possible with their own Lutheran, Methodist, Episcopalian, Baptist, or sect groups. Many of the post-war consignments of missionaries came from China and filled the mainland communities on Taiwan; others represent religious groups in principle non-cooperative and therefore shunning the main Presbyterian body. The Overseas Missionary Fellowship (former China Inland Mission) works largely among Taiwanese and *with* the Presbyterian Church. The True Jesus Church, entering from China, also works among Taiwanese.

There are encouraging instances of cooperation in particulars, such as training of ministers, literature, relief work, but the development of a real Christian Council is out of reach. Only since 1960 has a Consultative Conference, meeting annually and now twice a year for papers on program and methods of Christian work, achieved existence. Indeed, while many responsible leaders favor cooperation, it may be undesirable to have an organizational form which might be manipulated in public declarations on international questions or on other matters. As it is, the hyper-sensitiveness of the Government, accentuated by unsatisfactory press reports and by distorted charges over the Cleveland Study Conference in 1958 and the St. Andrew's statement of the CCIA in 1960, was again heated by accusations that New Delhi in 1961 had pursued that (alleged) line by advocating admission of Peking to the United Nations. Clearing up the errors was hardly sufficient to relieve the imputations put upon the Protestant churches.

A FORWARD LOOK IN CHRISTIAN ATTITUDES AND ACTION

The Consultation did not plan for a presentation and for studied comment on the duty of Christians, as citizens and as responsible members of churches, to take stands and to press for action in regard to China issues. Some of the foregoing discussions suggest or require response and action, though there may be wide variations of judgment and of conscience as to specific issues or measures.

The Consultation did provide for a closing session of review and proposal, in which various items were presented rapidly for attention, whether or not they had been put forward or implied in earlier sessions. *The following statements, therefore, are in no sense resolutions or recognized findings.* Even more than do prior pages in this booklet, they stand on their own.

The churches have an important responsibility in their concern for peace and helpful relations among nations, as well as in their concern for ecumenical fellowship and for the missionary extension of the faith, to provide their members and the citizenry with knowledge and guidance. Partisanship and gross misrepresentations of reality, suppression of free inquiry and discussion, the locking of national policy into rigid forms emotionally encased, are unhealthy errors. Few participants in the Consultation indicated that they were confident of the answers to the difficult problems of the relations of the United States, Taiwan, other Asian neighbors, or the United Nations, to Mainland China. But there appeared to be some assembly of feeling for more contact with the great mass of Chinese people and with the churches among them, along with recognition of the difficulties in the way and the mutuality required for beneficial association.

Several participants more clearly or less clearly appealed to our own attitudes and those of our constituency on lines like these: We must learn to appreciate the values and strengths – economic, social, psychological – in the Chinese Communist way of life so different from our own. We must also understand that the present Chinese leaders regard tolerance and liberal conduct as stupid weakness or calculated stratagem. Healthy development of countries near to China is both a defensive and an educational measure, consonant with Christian principles and politically desirable. Our first and major duty is not so much the urging of a particular action in the international or the national realm – such as, resumption of diplomatic relations at a particular moment or in one specific condition

— as the basic task of opening up minds and hearts to fit them for dealing with the big issues.

The Consultation was not dominated by an idealist blindness to the harsh course set by Communist power, or to the faults of actual politics in the United States. Deep concern for peace was not expressed in terms of renunciation of force, but rather in careful restraint of might to its proper uses. The pervading desire in the public arena is a strengthening of the hands of such bodies as the Commission of the Churches on International Affairs (World Council) and the Department of International Affairs (National Council of Churches), with encouragement to them to act more vigorously on the China issues.

A number of participants felt that our Churches ought to show more courage and take more risks in pressing forward on the lines of the best counsel we can muster. It is better to cause some controversy and to lose some friends than to huddle in timid passivity while dubious manipulators of public and even Congressional opinion — such as The Committee of "One Million" — exert great influence upon political decisions that may needlessly bring war or may needlessly delay the development of better relationships. Americans need continually to be reminded that wise friends, Christian friends in a number of countries cooperating with our own and approving much of what the United States has done in world affairs, consider that peculiarly in the matter of China and of Taiwan we emotionally and irrationally fix an attitude that refuses to see things as they are and to seek the best course possible in the actual situation.

In the realm of missionary and ecclesiastical responsibility, the need and hope for more knowledge and deeper understanding of Chinese Christians on the mainland, involving knowledge and understanding of the entire national life in which they participate,* were repeatedly asserted, and some detailed suggestions were mentioned as to how communication might be gradually developed. As for Taiwan, in which the lines are relatively open, the missionary factor should take more account of the needs and development of the Taiwanese, and should with patient persistence strive for reconciliation and cooperation between Taiwanese and mainlanders, as well as unity among the varied Christian persuasions.

*Attention was repeatedly called to the high quality of *The China Quarterly* (London), the best journal in the world on contemporary China in domestic and international aspects which draws upon the scholarship of the United States and other countries outside the British group.

A secondary theme, perhaps less widely supported by explicit statement, but convincingly put forward and not opposed, is the need for more penetrating understanding and more sympathetic consideration of the needs and sentiments of the numerically preponderant element in Taiwan -- people largely curtained off and ignored in the disproportionate prominence assigned to the regime and American commitments to the regime. Once again, the plea is addressed both to good citizenship and to good churchmanship. The missionary factor should take more account of the desires and the development of the Taiwanese, and should with patient persistence strive for reconciliation and cooperation between Taiwanese and mainlanders, as well as for unity among the varied Christian persuasions.

We have not attempted in this booklet to report the three devotional services which formed integral parts of the Consultation. It is fitting, however, that we close with words taken from the conclusion of one of the significant presentations:

"Do we allow enough for the fact that God is at work in China, and, however our contacts may be marred and broken His are unbroken? Chinese Christians are His people, and He is with them, and He is their God."

DATE DUE

NOV 23 '78

GAYLORD

PRINTED IN U.S.A.

